Norfolk Southern and its contractors overestimated the risk that five train cars could explode after the East Palestine, Ohio, train derailment last year, leading to the unnecessary release and burn of chemicals, the National Transportation Safety Board found Tuesday at its final meeting on the incident.
Tuesday’s meeting — where the NTSB approved the findings of its 17-month investigation into the Feb. 3, 2023 derailment — offered the most authoritative timeline yet of the decisions that caused a giant toxic plume to rise above the Ohio town in early 2023, which prompted alarm about environmental hazards and triggered a national debate about rail safety.
The agency made sweeping recommendations for federal regulators, railroads and other entities to tighten rules and shore up safety practices, while laying responsibility for the decision to vent and burn off vinyl chloride from five train cars at the feet of Norfolk Southern and its contractors, Specialized Professional Services Inc. and Specialized Response Solutions.
“This derailment and hazardous-material release was devastating,” NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said. “We can’t change the past. What we can do, based on facts, is work to ensure this never happens again.”
The derailment and chemical release roiled East Palestine — a town near the Pennsylvania border of roughly 4,600 people — drawing national attention to freight railroad safety and leaving residents with lingering fears of contamination.
A year and a half later, cleanup by the Environmental Protection Agency is ongoing — one of many ways the derailment’s effects are still being felt. In a report last week, researchers found that the toxic chemicals released in the burn spread over 16 states, reaching as far as South Carolina and New England.
Resident Krissy Ferguson, 50, said she felt “heartbroken” after the meeting. “Criminal charges need [to be] filed,” she told The Washington Post. “It’s time for our state and federal government to back their citizens.”
In a statement, Norfolk Southern said that it appreciated the NTSB’s investigation and that it had already addressed some of the identified factors, including providing emergency responders with train information, advocating for phasing out the vulnerable model of train cars and training first responders.
“We resolved not to wait for the NTSB’s final report before taking decisive action,” chief safety officer John Fleps said. The company will compare its protocol with the NTSB recommendations and examine what else to implement, it said.
The Association of American Railroads said many of the NTSB’s recommendations aligned with industry positions, saying railroads would review the agency’s findings and consider their next steps.
The NTSB laid out a chain of events that turned the 38-car derailment into a bigger disaster. The incident was likely caused by an overheated wheel bearing, which sparked fire and caused the train to go off the track, the NTSB found.
The situation then escalated at two different points: First, because three tank cars – of a model known to be vulnerable – carrying a flammable chemical were punctured, spilling their contents, which caught fire. Then, that fire ultimately prompted the railway and its contractors to push for the unusual step of releasing and burning vinyl chloride from five train cars.
The push for vent-and-burn by Norfolk Southern and its contractors, however, disregarded the fact that the temperature in the car of concern began dropping, which should have signaled that the danger was waning, the board said.
Norfolk Southern also failed to provide the local fire chief and other officials with a key report from the chemicals’ manufacturer, who had inspected the train cars and determined that the probability of the worst-case scenario was low, investigators found. With incomplete information from Norfolk Southern, the NTSB said, local and state officials had only 13 minutes to decide whether to give the go-ahead.
In addition, investigators found that firefighters and emergency responders stayed at the fiery derailment scene longer than they should have immediately after the crash because Norfolk Southern didn’t share information about what hazardous materials were on the train until an hour after firefighters arrived.
“This resulted in greater exposure of emergency responders and to the public to post-derailment hazards,” said NTSB investigator Troy Lloyd.
Norfolk Southern defended the decision to support the vent-and-burn, saying it disagreed with the NTSB’s conclusion that it withheld information from local officials. In a statement, the company said the NTSB “mischaracterized” the basis of the recommendation, saying those responding “could not sit and wait to see what happened under the circumstances.”
Ahead of Tuesday’s meeting, Norfolk Southern announced it would lead an industry working group to examine the vent-and-burn practice. It also released a report summarizing the company’s steps to increase safety, including new equipment, a system for communicating what trains are carrying to first responders and a reported reduction in accidents and employee injuries.
Tuesday’s meeting concluded the NTSB’s investigation; its full report will be released in a few weeks. In addition to examining the vent-and-burn, the investigation identified a variety of safety issues that contributed to the derailment.
Those included a lack of hazardous materials training for Ohio volunteer firefighters; and inefficient or limited systems that prevented a faster response at different points as the disaster unfolded.
During the first sign of trouble, the train crew wasn’t notified the first time a trackside device detected a high temperature on a wheel bearing of one train car, investigators said. Instead, the device likely measured the temperature lower than it really was, and the alert, categorized as noncritical, went to back-office personnel.
The crew was notified when the train passed a second detector, but they couldn’t stop the train in time to prevent derailing. After the cars went off the tracks, a punctured car spilled flammable butyl acrylate, which started a fire that spread more than 1,000 feet. That model of train car, the NTSB found, is being phased out for such use and won’t be eligible to carry butyl acrylate after May 2029.
Homendy also said chemical shippers should immediately take out of service the model of train car that was punctured, known as DOT-111 cars, and the NTSB recommended that federal regulators move to require that.
“The events that eventually led to the vent-and-burn could’ve been avoided had there been no DOT-111 tank cars carrying combustible and flammable liquids on this train,” Stancil said.
The emergency responders’ struggle to get information about what hazardous materials were in the train cars also affected the response, investigators said. When one called Norfolk Southern to ask for the information, the person who answered said she would call them back and never did.
Meanwhile, diamond-shaped placards on the train cars that show what they’re carrying burned in the fire, making them illegible.
The first responders had so little information that a volunteer firefighter who was a chemistry teacher was the one trying to evaluate some of the hazards, said Homendy.
Homendy also criticized Norfolk Southern’s approach to the NTSB’s investigation, saying the company delayed handing over or failed to provide information to the NTSB and attempted to “manufacture evidence” outside the NTSB’s investigation.
She alleged that a senior Norfolk Southern executive delivered what she and other NTSB employees interpreted as “a threat” two weeks ago when a senior executive allegedly asked her to “put to rest” speculation about whether Norfolk Southern pushed for the vent-and-burn to get train cars moving and suggested the results of the investigation could “close a chapter” for the railway.
Norfolk Southern spokesperson Thomas Crosson said the company “cooperated fully and ethically” with the investigation. “Our communications with NTSB staff and Board Members were always motivated by a desire to ensure they had all the relevant information for their independent evaluation and by a shared commitment to advance rail safety," he said in an email.
Last month, the railway agreed to a $310 million settlement with the federal government, requiring the railroad to pay for the Environmental Protection Agency’s cleanup efforts and penalties for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act. The railroad also reached a $600 million settlement in April to resolve class-action claims made by residents and businesses.
Norfolk Southern’s other steps include paying for the area’s water monitoring for the next 10 years, implementing a “waterways remediation plan” and providing a $25 million medical and mental health services program.
The NTSB’s recommendations will follow some industry changes and legislative and regulatory efforts already spurred by the disaster.
On Monday, the Department of Transportation announced a requirement that railroads provide local emergency agencies with information about all hazardous materials being carried through their areas. The disaster earlier led to a new federal rule requiring at least two people to operate long freight trains.
It has also prompted the railroad industry to institute some new safety measures, including expanding use of an app through which railroads can report what hazardous materials they’re carrying. At the same time, the railroad industry has used its lobbying muscle to block efforts in Congress to pass stricter safety standards, as The Post has reported.
The Association of American Railroads said the industry had already used the NTSB’s preliminary findings to “drive meaningful actions that address what happened” and examine bearings, wayside detectors, tank car standards and other areas.
“With the final report, railroads will carefully evaluate key learnings and determine next steps to meaningfully advance safety,” said Michael Rush, senior vice president of AAR safety and operations.
